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I. INTRODUCTION 
 In film, every item in a scene is part of the story.1 From actors to set 
designs, careful consideration is given to every detail to help convey the desired 
message or emotion.2 Production teams pursue a great level of detail, depth, and 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2020; B.A. 
Philosophy, California Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo, 2014. I would like to thank Distinguished 
Professor of Law John Sprankling for his guidance as faculty advisor to this Comment. I would also like to 
thank the entire Law Review editorial staff for their assistance with this article. Most of all, a special thank you 
to my friends and family for their constant support and encouragement. 
1.  ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., COSTUME DESIGN: DEFINING CHARACTER INSTRUCTIONAL 
GUIDE, 6 (2014), available at https://www.oscars.org/sites/oscars/files/teachersguide-costumedesign-2015.pdf 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).  
2.  Id.  
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realism in film, often requiring the use of copyrighted material to achieve this 
goal.3 Obvious background copyrighted materials in film include artwork, 
posters, and billboards.4 Less obvious background materials may include the 
architectural aspect of buildings, the design of furniture, and even the clothing of 
each character.5 
Character fashion choices in film promote free expression and allow viewers 
to understand the character's culture and individuality.6 Filmmakers pay close 
attention to fabrics used in film productions to ensure that their use incites the 
desired emotional effect.7 A genuine threat of infringement exists for textile 
designers when filmmakers select garments with their fabric designs for use in 
films.8 
Textile designers, like artists, spend countless hours creating masterpieces 
and are shocked when others steal, use, and profit from their designs without 
permission.9 Textile designers use unique combinations of shapes and colors to 
create copyrightable fabric pattern designs.10 These textile designers face 
uncertainty in protecting their creations and often struggle to control the rights 
and uses of their designs.11 Filmmakers and television producers may be liable 
for copyright infringement for using another artist’s copyrighted design, without 
permission, to recreate a derivative version of the original in the background of a 
 
3.  See generally John M. Garon, Managing Content in the Frame: Script Clearance, Background 
Copyrights and Third-Party Ownership Rights, GCG LAW 4–5 (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/entertainment/filmcontent.html(on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (describing how copyrighted works are “being used as background or foreground decoration on a 
feature film or television show.”). 
4.  Id.  
5.  Adam Freeman, IP Clearance in Motion Pictures, Videos and Other Audio-Visual Works, MEDIUM 
(July 31, 2017), https://medium.com/@adamcolefreedman/ip-clearance-in-motion-pictures-videos-and-other-
audio-visual-works-87ab5fc6734b (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
6.  ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., supra note 1.  
7.  Id. at 6–7.  
8.  See generally Tyler McCall, Copyright, Trademark, Patent: Your Go-To Primer for Fashion 
Intellectual Property Law, FASHIONISTA (Dec. 16, 2016), https://fashionista.com/2016/12/fashion-law-patent-
copyright-trademark (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the copyrightability of 
fabric). 
9.  See generally Ona Abelis, Copyrighting Creativity: What Rights Do Artists Really Have?, BROOKLYN 
MAG. (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.bkmag.com/2015/08/27/copyrighting-creativity-what-rights-do-artists-
really-have/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting artist, Regina Elliot, describing 
struggles young artists often go through in their inability to obtain proper representation to protect their designs 
“[I] couldn’t afford it and was always dependent on who the scheme-y person I was working with and how 
creatively they tried to abuse my rights.”).  
10.  Amanda Schallert, Fashion Lawyers Have Seen Textile Copyright Litigation Increase Over the Past 
Five Years, EARLY SULLIVAN (June 10, 2016), https://www.earlysullivan.com/fashion-lawyers-have-seen-
textile-copyright-litigation-increase-over-the-past-five-years-los-angeles-and-san-francisco-daily-journal (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
11.  McCall, supra note 8; see Abelis, supra note 9 (explaining position artists are put in when attempting 
to gain recognition: “The galleries, museums, and buyers have the power and the resources to call the shots and 
the artists have to quietly sign on the dotted line.”). 
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film.12 Generally, media production teams must obtain clearance from the owner 
before using a copyrighted design.13 
In recent years, clothing retailers faced increased litigation due to copyright 
infringement suits by textile designers.14 Between 2009 and 2015, four textile 
designers filed thousands of copyright infringement suits against a handful of 
retailers for their use of copyrighted textile patterns.15 One example is Unicolors, 
Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., where a Los Angeles based fabric manufacturer 
sued a worldwide retail company operating more than 500 stores.16 
In Unicolors, the retailer, Urban Outfitters, designed and sold a dress made 
of fabric similar to one owned by Unicolors.17 Both fabric patterns featured 
“nearly identical” details of “crowded arrangements of splayed floral and feather 
motifs.”18 The major difference between the two patterns was the color 
arrangement—the original Unicolors pattern was red, purple, black, and white, 
while the Urban Outfitters design was blue and yellow.19 
Two years prior to Urban Outfitters’ release of their dress design, Unicolors 
registered its copyrighted pattern to protect its creation as an investment against 
competition.20 Additionally, in the three years surrounding Urban Outfitters’ use 
of fabric similar to the one owned by Unicolors, Unicolors sold over 14,000 
yards of their original fabric to various customers within the United States.21 
Unicolors sought to prove Urban Outfitters infringed on their design because 
absent copying, it would be impossible for the designs to be so similar.22 
Ultimately, the court held that due to the overwhelming similarities in the 
patterns and circumstantial inferences of copying the design, Urban Outfitters 





Generally, the Copyright Act of 1976 (“Copyright Act”) protects only 
original color arrangements, patterns, and novel combinations of various artistic 
 
12.  Abelis, supra note 9.   
13.  Freeman, supra note 5.  
14.  Ian P. Murphy, The Rise of Copyright Infringement Lawsuits—and What Retailers Can Do About it, 
RETAIL DIVE (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.retaildive.com/news/the-rise-of-copyright-infringement-
lawsuitsand-what-retailers-can-do-about/404336/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
15.  Id.  
16.  Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 983–84 (9th Cir. 2017).  
17.  Id. at 984.  
18.  Id. at 985–86. 
19.  Id. at 985. 
20.  Id. at 984. 
21.  Id.  
22.  Id. at 985–86. 
23.  Id. at 987–88. 
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elements.24 The Copyright Act also provides that the “fair use” of any 
copyrighted material is not infringement.25 The Copyright Act further provides 
four factors for courts to consider when analyzing whether use is fair.26 However, 
courts have applied the factors inconsistently causing mixed results across 
jurisdictions.27 
To provide a guide for compliance with copyright law and to protect textile 
designers, the Copyright Act should be amended to include an additional factor 
inspired by the Second and Ninth Circuit’s fair use analysis of copyrighted 
materials.28 By analogizing standards from cases involving fabric patterns and 
background art used in film, this Comment will set forth a standard for those in 
the entertainment industry to determine what constitutes infringement regarding 
fabric patterns used in film.29 
Part II of this Comment will provide a brief explanation of copyright law and 
its relation to textile designers.30 Part III will discuss copyrighting fabric pattern 
designs.31 Part IV will describe the Useful Article Doctrine and determine 
whether integration of fabric designs into useful articles results in a loss of 
copyright protection.32 Part V will discuss the Fair Use Doctrine’s application to 
copyrighted fabric through case analysis.33 Part VI will then discuss and suggest 
a standard that can be implemented to provide a guide for those in the film 




II. COPYRIGHT LAW 
The Copyright Act protects “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”35 Copyright law provides definitive protection 
 
24.  17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); Oliver Herzfeld, Protecting 
Fashion Designs, FORBES (Jan. 3, 2013, 9:14 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliverherzfeld/2013/01/03/protecting-fashion-designs/#1b80a04db317 (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
25.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29).  
26.  Id. at § 107(1)–(4). 
27. NIMIA, Copyright Infringement in Videos, 8, 15, available at https://nimia.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/10/Copyright-Infringement-in-Videos.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review); Laurie Tomassian, Transforming the Fair Use Landscape by Defining the Transformative Factor, 90 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1329, 1335 (2017).  
28.  See infra Part VI (suggesting additional factor to be included in Copyright Act).  
29.  Infra Part IV. 
30.  Infra Part II. 
31.  Infra Part III; Section III.A.  
32.  Infra Part IV.  
33.  Infra Part V. 
34.  Infra Part IV. 
35.  17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29). 
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for textile designers for their original prints, patterns, and color arrangements.36 
Intellectual property law, more generally, provides protection for the creation of 
intangible property.37 While specific protections are available through patent and 
trademark law, copyright law provides the best protection because all original 
works are automatically copyrighted upon creation or fixation in a physical 
medium.38 
 Copyright protection affords creators exclusive rights to reproduce, 
publicly display, prepare derivative versions, and distribute copies made of their 
own copyrighted works.39 Owning a copyright offers a right to inhibit others 
from exploiting copyrighted designs.40 Artists even retain copyright protection 
after the sale of items integrating their copyrighted designs within them.41 This 
provides certainty in copyright protection which allows textile designers to 
prevent knock-off recreations of their own designs.42 
 Copyright protection is not available, however, for thoughts or ideas.43 If 
an individual hears of or is told of an idea that is not fixed in a tangible 
expression, they are free to use it.44 Additionally, and as related to fabric designs, 
one cannot hold a copyright over the idea of a particular pattern or design.45 This 
means that no single textile designer can monopolize the ownership of a 
particular shape or color, but can protect their tangible expression that integrates 
such shapes or colors into a unique design.46 
 
 
 Registration is not required to own a copyright.47 Protection is afforded 
whether or not designs are ever published or registered.48 However, copyright 
registration is much easier than the formal requirements of patent and trademark 
protection: individuals register online, complete an application, provide a copy of 
 
36.  Herzfeld, supra note 24.  
37.  McCall, supra note 8. 
38.  Abelis, supra note 9.  
39.  17 U.S.C.A. § 106A (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29). 
40.  Anne Kearns, Copyright in the Fashion Business? It All Depends . . ., ANNE KEARNS LAW (Feb. 20, 
2018), https://www.annekearnslaw.com/single-post/2018/02/13/Copyrights-in-the-Fashion-Business-It-All-
Depends (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
41.  Abelis, supra note 9.  
42.  David E. Shipley, All for COPYRIGHT Stand Up and Holler! Three Cheers for Star Athletica and the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Perceived and Imagined Separately Test, U. GA. SCHOOL OF LAW 152 (Univ. Ga. Sch. of 
L., Res. Paper No. 2017-25, 2018).  
43.  Kearns, supra note 40.  
44.  Id.  
45.  Emily F. Evitt, Copyright Protection of Fabric Designs, MS&K’S FASHION INDUSTRY BLOG (Nov. 5, 
2012), available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/281322ca-b4e5-4e14-8d09-
358df8ea391b.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
46.  Id.  
47.  Kearns, supra note 40.  
48.  Id.  
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the work to be registered, and pay a filing fee.49 
Artists, or copyright holders, automatically receive protection when they 
create their designs, but they may face difficulties proving ownership in litigation 
because filing a federal suit for infringement requires copyright registration.50 
While not technically required to obtain copyright protection, registration is 
necessary for those intending to enforce copyright ownership as registration 
provides notice of ownership to others.51 
The Supreme Court recently decided a case resolving the jurisdictional split 
as to whether applying for protection alone could satisfy the registration 
requirement.52 The Court held that while certain circumstances may allow for 
filing infringement suits prior to registration, copyright owners must eventually 
obtain registration over their copyrights to maintain their suits.53 
With the exponential growth in the number lawsuits pertaining to textile 
infringement, this development by the Supreme Court affects the use of fabric 
patterns in film because registration may take months to complete which could 
stall production or interfere with film schedules.54 Regardless, the registration 
requirement must be met prior to filing any infringement suit.55 
III. IS FABRIC COPYRIGHTABLE? 
Determining what features in the fashion industry are copyrightable can be 
confusing.56 A necessary distinction exists between “fabric design” and “dress 
design.”57 “Fabric design” refers to patterns printed on fabric.58 These designs 
often include artistic and unique elements, which—like any other artistic 
creation—maintain copyright protection.59 “Dress design” refers to the style, cut, 
 
49.  Abelis, supra note 9.   
50.  Id.  
51.  See Kearns, supra note 40 (describing marks used to provide notice of copyright rights as “© [year] 
by [name of owner]” as well as use of “‘Copyright’ or ‘Copr.’ in place of the ©”). 
52.  Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, L.L.C., 139 S. Ct. 881, 886 (2019).  
53.  Id. at 888.  
54.  See Amanda Schallert, Fashion Lawyers Have Seen Textile Copyright Litigation Increase Over the 
Past Five Years, EARLY SULLIVAN (June 10, 2016), https://www.earlysullivan.com/fashion-lawyers-have-seen-
textile-copyright-litigation-increase-over-the-past-five-years-los-angeles-and-san-francisco-daily-journal (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the fact that of the 2,500 copyright infringement 
cases filed between 2011 and 2015 in the Central District of California, 417 were filed by textile 
manufacturers); see generally Fourth Estate, 139 S. Ct. at 892 (discussing increased wait times for copyright 
registration process).  
55.  See id. at 888 (2019) (holding “the copyright owner must eventually pursue registration in order to 
maintain a suit for infringement.”).  
56.  Kearns, supra note 40.  
57.  Carl Mazurek, Fashion Copyright and the Muddle of the Useful Articles Doctrine, N.Y.U. J. INTELL. 
PROP. & ENT. L. BLOG (Oct. 26, 2015), https://blog.jipel.law.nyu.edu/2015/10/fashion-copyright-and-the-
muddle-of-the-useful-articles-doctrine/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
58.  Id.  
59.  Id.  
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or shape of clothing.60 Dress design represents the utility and functional aspect of 
clothing.61 
The distinction between dress design and fabric design provides a significant 
defining line related to the available copyright protections for fashion designers.62 
Recognizing the similarities between uniquely-dyed fabrics and artistic creations 
on canvas, the Copyright Office provides textile designers protections for their 
fabric designs.63 Textile designers take unique shapes and colors which  may not 
be eligible for protection alone and arrange them in ways that create novel 
combinations of designs.64 
The artistic features of fabric designs are copyrightable, so long as they are 
separable from their utility or functionality.65 Only the separable elements of the 
fabric prints are copyrightable.66 For example, envision a piece of fabric as a two-
ply square, then separate the top layer from the bottom.67 This separation leaves 
two identifiable elements: the unique print on the top layer and the actual, 
tangible piece of fabric.68 The fabric, which serves an entirely functional purpose, 
is not copyrightable, but the artistic and separable element of the fabric pattern 
is.69 
The jurisdictional inconsistencies between the Second and Ninth Circuits’ 
analysis of copyright protection over fabric design needs resolution.70 Courts in 
the Second Circuit traditionally focus on the “ordinary observer” test to 
determine whether designs are “substantially similar.”71 Ninth Circuit courts use 
an extrinsic and intrinsic analysis of the copyrighted designs to determine 
whether they are “substantially similar.”72 
The Second Circuit decided Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. and analyzed 
the use of copyrighted appliques on various clothing items.73 There, New York 
manufacturer, Knitwaves, sued a competing manufacturer, Lollytogs, after 
noticing comparable designs on sweaters manufactured by each company.74 A 
 
60.  Id.  
61.  Id.  
62.  Id.  
63.  McCall, supra note 8. 
64.  Schallert, supra note 54.  
65.  Intellectual Property Alert: Will Fashion Designers Finally Be Clothed in “Copyright” Protection?, 
VORYS (Sept. 13, 2012), https://www.vorys.com/publications-656.html (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
66.  McCall, supra note 8.  
67.  See Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 1004 (2017) (discussing 
conceptual separation); see also Shipley, supra note 42 at 157–58 (explaining different separability tests 
established by courts in copyright infringement cases).  
68.  McCall, supra note 8.  
69.  Id.  
70.  See Evitt, supra note 45 (discussing jurisdictional inconsistencies).  
71.  Id.  
72.  Id.  
73.  Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 999 (2d Cir. 1995). 
74.  Id.  
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design executive at Lollytogs had brought in a Knitwaves sweater and had 
instructed his team to create the “same feel” as those from Knitwaves.75 
Lollytogs created its sweater design using no other inspiration aside from the 
original design of the Knitwaves sweater.76 
After showing proof of a valid copyright, a plaintiff alleging copyright 
infringement must prove “(1) the defendant has actually copied the plaintiff’s 
work; and (2) the copying is illegal because substantial similarity exists between 
the defendant’s work and the protectable element of the plaintiff’s.”77 Knitwaves 
and Lollytogs agreed the designs were copied, but disagreed as to whether the 
designs were substantially similar.78 The court stated the test for determining 
whether designs are substantially similar is that of the “ordinary observer,” where 
the court analyzes “whether an average lay observer would recognize the alleged 
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”79 
The court, in viewing the totality of the designs, held that “[a]n observer 
viewing the sweaters side by side cannot help but perceive them as coming from 
one creative source.”80 Despite the minor changes Lollytogs attempted to create 
in their new sweater design, such as the number of appliques used and additional 
pattern designed, “the differences pale[d] in comparison to the overwhelming 
impression of similarity” to the Knitwaves sweater.81 Reasoning the designs were 
substantially similar, the court held Lollytogs liable for copyright infringement of 




The Ninth Circuit, in L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 
extended its own “substantially similar” analysis by including extrinsic and 
intrinsic tests.83 There, a fabric printing company sued a retailer  after noticing 
clothing bearing similar designs to copyrighted patterns available for sale in their 
stores.84 To prove the defendants copied the design, the court required proof of 
plaintiff’s valid copyright, defendant’s access to plaintiff’s design, and  
substantial similarity between designs.85 While failing to make an ultimate 
 
75.  Id. at 1000. 
76.  Id.  
77. Id. at 1002; see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) 
(discussing requirements for federal copyright suit as “To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must 
prove two elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work 
that are original.”). 
78.  Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002. 
79.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80.  Id. at 1004. 
81.  Id. at 1004–05. 
82.  Id. at 1005. 
83.  L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2012).  
84.  Id. at 845. 
85.  Id. at 846 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 
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determination on the facts, the court clarified its own “substantially similar” 
analysis.86 
In determining whether separate designs are “substantially similar” the court 
explained that it applies a two-part, extrinsic and intrinsic, test: 
The extrinsic test is an objective comparison of specific expressive 
elements; it focuses on the articulable similarities between the two 
works. The intrinsic test is a subjective comparison that focuses on 
whether the ordinary, reasonable audience would find the works 
substantially similar in the total concept and feel of the works.87 
In its extrinsic test, the court relied on the Knitwaves “ordinary observer test” 
to compare the similarity of designs.88 While the court found many objective 
similarities in color arrangement and overall pattern, it ultimately found genuine 
disputes regarding material facts of substantial similarity because a jury could 
find similarities or differences in design and process.89 Additionally, in its 
intrinsic analysis, the court looked more subjectively at the ordinary observer to 
determine if the designs were substantially similar.90 
Though the court did not decide on either the extrinsic or intrinsic evaluation 
of the substantially similar analysis, the court held the “subjective evaluation of 
the expressive similarities in two fabric designs…is best suited for the trier of 
fact.”91 L.A. Printex provides a distinction in the substantially similar analysis 
where “[t]he extrinsic test considers the objective similarities in two works and 
leaves the subjective analysis of such similarities to the intrinsic test.”92 
 
 
The distinction between dress design and fabric design provides textile 
designers with copyright protection over the separable portions of fabric patterns 
like other forms of art.93 As fabric is copyrightable, if a textile designer sees their 
design used in film without their permission, they may file a copyright 
infringement claim.94 Courts should reconcile the inconsistent application of the 
“substantially similar” analysis to provide for uniformity on the federal level.95 
 
(discussing valid copyright requirement for federal copyright suit).  
86.  L.A. Printex, 676 F.3d at 848–852.  
87.  Id. at 848 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
88.  Id.  
89.  Id. at 850–51. 
90.  Id. at 852. 
91.  Id.  
92.  Id.  
93.  McCall, supra note 8. 
94.  Abelis, supra note 9.  
95.  Evitt, supra note 45; see infra Part VI (proposing additional factor to fair use analysis).  
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IV. IS COPYRIGHT PROTECTION LOST WHEN FABRIC IS INTEGRATED INTO A 
USEFUL ARTICLE? 
Traditionally, the United States has not recognized fashion as a form of art.96 
Described as “easier stated than applied,” the Useful Article Doctrine 
encapsulates a principle at the core of the Copyright Act by refusing to extend 
protection to primarily utilitarian or functional designs.97 The Useful Article 
Doctrine causes confusion in the fashion industry because designers can 
copyright portions of designs, but a designer cannot copyright the design itself.98 
While the Copyright Act clearly does not protect useful articles, the lack of 
uniformity in the application of the doctrine creates overwhelming uncertainty 
for design manufacturers regarding available protections for their designs.99 Part 
A describes the Useful Article Doctrine’s limitation on copyright protection.100 
Part B examines the impact of a recent Supreme Court case, Star Athletica, LLC. 
v. Varsity Brands, Inc., on copyright protection within the fashion industry.101 
A. The Useful Article Doctrine 
The Copyright Act defines a useful article as a tangible work “having 
intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the 
article or to convey information.”102 The Copyright Act recognizes the limited 
copyrightability of design components that are independent and separable from 
their functional or utilitarian aspects.103 Dress design—like a garment’s shape, 
style, or cut—is a useful article as its function is inseparable from any 
identifiable artistic element.104 The shape, cut, or style of a garment has the 
purely functional value of being worn.105 These functional designs are not 
“independent artistic work[s]” that qualify for copyright protection.106 
Copyright law does not protect items which are functional or utilitarian.107 In 
 
96.  Mazurek, supra note 57 (explaining the difference between the correlation in European fashion to 
“traditional fine arts” as opposed to fashion in the United States which “has been treated as more akin to 
products such as lamps or furniture”).  
97.  Id.; Norman J. Leonard, Applying Copyright Law to Useful Articles – A Dispute Over Cheerleading 
Uniforms May Result In A New, Unified Test, WARD & SMITH (Oct. 4, 2016), 
https://wardandsmith.com/articles/applying-copyright-law-to-useful-articles (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review). 
98.  Kearns, supra note 40.  
99.  Leonard, supra note 97. 
100.  Infra Section IV.A. 
101.  Infra Section IV.B.  
102.  17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (defining “useful article”).  
103.  Leonard, supra note 97.  
104.  Kearns, supra note 40.  
105.  Id.  
106.  Id.  
107.  Id.  
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1954, the Supreme Court upheld this principle in Mazer v. Stein.108 In Mazer, an 
artist created original statuette sculptures of dancers and a manufacturer copied 
the design and incorporated it into a lamp base without the artist’s permission.109 
The Copyright Office allowed for protection over the statuette sculptures as 
works of art “in so far as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects 
are concerned….”110 
The Court further explained that while integrated into a lamp base, the 
original sculpture did not lose its copyright protection because there was some 
artistic value in the statuette itself.111 The Court used the separation between the 
statuette and the lamp to create a separation test to determine the copyrightability 
of an item; however, the Court did not discuss how to apply the test.112 In 
recognizing copyright protection for artistic objects, the Court held protection is 
“given only to the expression of the idea—not the idea itself.”113 
To “codify” Mazer, the Copyright Act further explains the application of the 
Useful Article Doctrine as: 
[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be 
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the 
extent that such design incorporates pictoral, graphic, or scriptural 
features that can be identified separately from and are capable of existing 
independently from the article.114 
The added distinction requires a separation from the useful feature of the 
design.115 Jurisdictions have struggled to consistently apply the separability 
analysis when evaluating copyrightability.116 Courts previously used a physical 
separation requirement when analyzing the separability test, but soon realized the 
physical requirement was insufficient to cover all copyright infringement suits.117 
Though designers use fabric to make clothing, the integration does not 
destroy copyright protection because designers can satisfy the separability 
requirement necessary for copyright protection conceptually, meaning no actual 
separation of the design needs to occur.118 The design is protected so long as one 
 
108.  Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218–19 (1954). 
109.  Id. at 202–03. 
110.  Id. at 212.  
111.  See id. at 214–16 (1954) (discussing copyright protections available for a statuette lamp base).  
112.  Shipley, supra note 42, at 155–57 (discussing adaptation of the separability test). 
113.  Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217. 
114.  Shipley, supra note 42, at 155; see 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) 
(defining “Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” as they relate to useful articles). 
115.  Leonard, supra note 97.  
116.  Patrick K. McClay, Has Copyright Protection Expanded for Useful Articles?, BAKER BOTTS (Nov. 
2017), http://www.bakerbotts.com/insights/publications/2017/11/ip-report-p-mcclay (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review). 
117.  Shipley, supra note 42.  
118.  Intellectual Property Alert, supra note 65; Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
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can perceive a separation between the fabric design and the utility of whatever 
garment it is on.119 Courts began to use adaptations of the separability test to 
allow for conceptual separation, but the numerous tests resulted in jurisdictional 
inconsistencies when applied.120 
B. Star Athletica, LLC. v. Varsity Brands, Inc. 
In 2017, the Supreme Court decided a case that significantly impacted 
copyright protections for textile designers and manufacturers.121 The Court 
granted certiorari to resolve the jurisdictional inconsistencies and “widespread 
disagreement over the proper test for implementing § 101’s separate 
identification and independent-existence requirements.”122 Addressing significant 
concerns regarding separability and issues related to functionality and utility of 
garments, the decision in Star Athletica provided textile manufactures more 
opportunity for protection over “graphical or sculptural” elements of their 
designs.123 
In Star Athletica, a clothing manufacturer, Varsity Brands, sued a competing 
manufacturer, Star Athletica, for alleged infringement of a copyrighted 
cheerleading uniform design.124 The case centered around the consideration of 
affording copyright protection for the separable features and industrial designs of 
“the particular combination of chevrons, zigzags and stripes that characterizes 
Varsity’s uniforms.”125 Ultimately, the Court’s decision allowed copyright 
protection for items that are not necessary to the garment’s utility.126 
To resolve disagreements between courts related to separability and 
functionality in the fashion industry, the Court expanded copyright protection 
and determined: 
[T]hat a feature incorporated into the design of a useful  article is eligible 
for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- 
 
1002, 1013–14 (2017). 
119.  Intellectual Property Alert, supra note 65; Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1032.  
120.  Shipley, supra note 42 (discussing the nine different tests applied for conceptual separability and 
explaining “[t]he several tests as well as the varied results caused one judge to write that courts ‘have twisted 
themselves in knots trying to create a test to effectively ascertain whether the artistic aspects of a useful article 
can be identified separately from and exist independently of the article’s utilitarian function.’ Another court 
stated that ‘the [conceptual separability] analysis often sounds more like metaphysics than law.’”).  
121.  Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1004–05 (2017); see Shipley, supra note 42 (describing the impact of 
Star Athletica).  
122.  Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. 
123.  Mazurek, supra note 57.  
124.  Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. 
125.  Id. at 1008 (2017); Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Court Uses Cheerleader Uniform Case to 
Validate Broad Copyright in Industrial Designs, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 22, 2017, 9:31 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/opinion-analysis-court-uses-cheerleader-uniform-case-validate-broad-
copyright-industrial-designs/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
126.  Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1010–12; Mazurek, supra note 57.  
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or three-dimensional work of art separate from the useful article and (2) 
would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work—
either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—
if it were imagined separately from the useful article into which it is 
incorporated.127 
The Court created a two-part test for analysis of separability as related to 
fabric design and useful articles.128 Applying their test to the striped decoration 
on cheerleading uniforms, the Court noted that Varsity Brands used and applied 
their copyrighted stripe design on multiple types of clothing and that in doing so, 
replicated the design and not the uniform itself.129 
Additionally, the Court explained that regardless of the stripe design use on 
several different uniforms, the design maintained its protection as a “work of 
art.”130 Reiterating the distinction between dress design and fabric design, the 
Court stated that although Star Athletica gained protection of their design, they 
“have no right to prohibit a person from manufacturing a cheerleading uniform of 
identical shape, cut, and dimension….”131 The Court held that the placement or 
integration of a separable copyrighted work into the useful article—the stripes 
sewn onto the cheerleading uniform—did not prevent copyright protection.132 
Star Athletica reconciled jurisdictional inconsistencies in the application of 
the separability doctrine.133 When designers integrate uniquely crafted textile 
designs into clothing, the fabric patterns retain copyright protection because one 
can perceive a separation between the fabric design and the tangible fabric.134 In 
film, costume designers create clothing for characters using various fabric 
patterns.135 Star Athletica created a recognition of copyright protection for textile 
designers when films portray their patterns reproduced on useful articles.136 
V. IS THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED FABRIC ON CLOTHING IN FILM FAIR USE? 
The Copyright Act provides various limitations on the exclusive use of 
copyrighted materials.137 The Copyright Act states “the fair use of a copyrighted 
 
127.  Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007. 
128.  Id.  
129.  Id. at 1012.  
130.  See id. (providing an example of protecting artwork on a guitar and explaining “[i]f that entire 
design in imaginatively removed from the guitar’s surface . . . the design if a two-dimensional work of art that 
corresponds to the shape of the useful article to which it is applied.”). 
131.  Id. at 1013. 
132.  Id. at 1012.  
133.  McClay, supra note 116. 
134.  See Star Athletica, 137 S. Ct. at 1007–1010 (discussing the test for separation from a useful article). 
135.  ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., supra note 1, at 7. 
136.  See Shipley, supra note 42 (explaining copyright protections afforded to textile designers after Star 
Athletica). 
137.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Limitations on exclusive use: 
2019 / The Use of Copyrighted Fabrics in Film 
114 
work … is not an infringement of copyright.”138 No infringement occurs when 
the use is fair.139 The Copyright Act does not define “fair use,” but lays out four 
factors to determine if the use of copyrighted materials is fair.140 
Additionally, another defense is available to those using copyrighted 
works—“de minimis” use.141 If the use is so small, insignificant, or de minimis, a 
court may allow use without analyzing any fair use factors.142 Though related to 
the substantiality factor, courts do not solely determine de minimis use of 
copyrighted works in film by the length of time used.143 Some courts focus on 
whether one could observe or recognize the copyrighted work in the film.144 
Filmmakers may claim the use of such textile as incidental and fair resulting 
in no infringement liability, but any significant use requires permission from the 
owner.145 The Copyright Act recognizes distinct ownership rights between a 
copyright and the copyright integrated into an object; thus, clothing made of 
copyrighted fabric patterns and used on television without the permission of the 
owner may result in copyright infringement liability.146 
Subsection A describes the fair use doctrine and the four factors used to 
analyze the doctrine.147 Subsection B discusses cases where courts analyzed the 
use of background art in film, which is analogous to fabric use in film.148 
 
Fair Use”); 17 U.S.C.A. § 108 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Limitations on exclusive use: 
Reproduction by libraries and archives”); 17 U.S.C.A. § 109 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) 
(“Limitations on exclusive use: Effect of transfer of particular copy or phonorecord”); 17 U.S.C. § 110 (West, 
Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Limitations on exclusive use: Exemption of certain performances and 
displays”); 17 U.S.C.A. § 111 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Limitations on exclusive use: 
Secondary transmissions of broadcast programming by cable”). 
138.  See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (providing examples for certain 
instances of fair use: “by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that 
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research.”).  
139.  Id.  
140.  Id.  
141.  See generally Rich Stim, Measuring Fair Use: The Four Factors, STAN. UNIV. LIBR.: COPYRIGHT 
& FAIR USE, https://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-factors/ (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (describing the de minimis exception to using copyrighted work). 
142.  Id.  
143.  Id.  
144.  Id.  
145.  Andrew Hudson, Copyright & Artwork in Movies, PHOTOSECRETS (last updated Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.photosecrets.com/copyright-artwork-movies (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review). 
146.  See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of 
any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the 
work is embodied.”).  
147.  Infra Section V.A.  
148.  Infra Section V.B.  
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A. The Fair Use Doctrine 
The fair use doctrine is the most important defense to avoid liability for 
copyright infringement.149 Through an application of four statutory factors, the 
fair use doctrine allows for use of copyrighted material in limited 
circumstances.150 The application of such factors often produces inconsistent 
results.151 The factors of the fair use doctrine include: 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the 
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work.152 
The first factor, “the purpose and character of the use,” analyzes the 
transformative nature of a new design compared to a previously copyrighted 
design.153 Courts use the first factor to determine if a new design is original or 
merely copied from a previously created design.154 By taking the time to 
determine why someone used the copyrighted material, courts can evaluate if that 
use is actually “fair.”155 Merely copying a previously created design can result in 
infringement liability, but a transformative or novel use of a portion of a 
copyrighted design might justify application of the fair use defense.156 
Additionally, uses for research, education, or scholarship may be fair because 
they face commentary and review.157 
The second factor analyzes the characteristics and attributes of the 
copyrighted work.158 In evaluating the nature of the work, the second factor 
reinforces the importance of copyright law in the United States because it 
prioritizes the control copyright owners have over the use of their design.159 For 
example, use of facts or publicly-beneficial information is fair, whereas use of 
 
149.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); Stim, supra note 141; Laurie 
Tomassian, Transforming the Fair Use Landscape by Defining the Transformative Factor, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1329, 1335 (2017).  
150.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); Stim, supra note 141.  
151.  Id.  
152.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1)–(4) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29). 
153.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); see also Stim, supra note 141.  
154.  Id.  
155.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985) (describing 
differences between commercial and nonprofit use of copyrighted materials).  
156.  Stim, supra note 141.  
157.  Id.  
158.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107(2) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29). 
159.  Id.; Stim, supra note 141.  
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another’s fictional work is more difficult to characterize as fair.160 Using 
unpublished rather than published materials can result in unfair use because 
original owners control the initial appearance of their design or creation.161 
Inappropriate use destroys a copyright owner’s creative control over their design, 
which often results in a finding of unfair use.162 
The third factor focuses on the amount and substantiality of portions used 
from a copyrighted work.163 Simply put, “[t]he less you take, the more likely that 
your copying will be excused as a fair use.”164 Although, if someone copies a 
substantial or essential portion of a copyrighted work, that use is not “fair.”165 
However, substantive use of copyrighted material in a parody is less problematic 
because the creators of the parody need the essential portions to create their own 
original work.166 
The fourth factor focuses on the economic effect the use of the copyrighted 
material has on the market.167 If the use deprives a copyright owner of potential 
profits or future economic opportunities, the use is likely unfair.168 Regardless of 
any competition with the original copyright owner, depriving the owner of profits 
will likely result in litigation.169 Even the adapted use of copyrighted works as 
inspiration can result in infringement liability because the creation of a different 
market results in lost profits to the original owner.170 Additionally, courts treat 
lost profits or economic impact from parodies differently than mere 
appropriation, with some courts even allowing use when the parody completely 
destroys the market or value for the original.171 
Although applying each of the four factors seems simple, courts struggle to 
apply the factors uniformly.172 Courts seem to apply each factor differently or 
consider particular factors more significantly than others.173 Additionally, the fair 
 
160.  See id. (discussing the application of the “nature of the copyrighted work” factor). 
161.  Id.  
162.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nations Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985) (holding that 
publishing the content of a copyrighted manuscript without permission from the owner prior to publication “so 
clearly infringes the copyright holder’s interests in confidentiality and creative control [that it] is difficult to 
characterize it as ‘fair’.”).  
163.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29). 
164.  Stim, supra note 141.  
165.  See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 564–65 (explaining that although only 13% of the entire 
copyrighted work was copied in the infringing book, the court held the portion taken was “essentially the heart 
of the book.”). 
166.  Stim, supra note 141.  
167.  17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29); Stim, supra note 141.  
168.  Id.  
169.  Id.  
170.  See generally Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding the creation and sale of 
sculptures inspired by a copyrighted photograph infringed on an opportunity for the photographer to profit from 
the sculpture market of his own original design).  
171.  Stim, supra note 141.  
172.  Id.  
173.  NIMIA, supra note 27, at 7. 
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use factors provide a general basis for analyzing the use of copyrighted materials, 
but courts also consider additional factors in their analysis.174 Alternate 
considerations include time used, context, and size of the copyrighted material.175 
The fair use analysis becomes complicated because “each case must be 
decided on its own facts and tailored to the issues at hand.”176 Copyright law is 
meant to discourage unlawful use or copying of another’s work, but lawmakers 
can amend the law to resolve disagreements in the fair use factor analysis.177 
B. Background Art in Film 
Film scene complexities require the use of various background items to 
provide greater visual detail and realism.178 Similarly to background art, films use 
clothing to help portray certain qualities, tendencies, or emotions of characters.179 
Whether in the foreground or background of a scene, filmmakers cannot use 
copyrighted materials without obtaining the express permission from the 
copyright owner, unless the use is fair.180 While the fair use factors provide some 
guidance in analyzing copyright infringement, applying each factor—especially 
in cases involving the use of copyrighted items in a film’s background—causes 




In Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, Inc., the Second Circuit considered an 
additional factor in the fair use analysis called “observability.”182 In Ringgold, an 
artist brought a copyright infringement suit against a television station, Black 
Entertainment Television (“BET”), for their use of a poster version of her 
copyrighted design on a television show.183 Faith Ringgold, an artist, created a 
quilted silk-screened print piece entitled “Church Picnic Story Quilt.”184 The 
High Museum of Art in Atlanta, Georgia actually owned the quilt and Ringgold 
granted exclusive rights for reproduction of the poster versions for sale in the 
museum.185 
 
174.  Id. at 6. 
175.  Id.  
176.  Id.  
177.  See NIMIA, supra note 27, at 17 (describing stock agencies use of copyrighted materials in film). 
178.  See generally Garon, supra note 3 (describing how copyrighted works are “being used as 
background or foreground decoration on a feature film or television show.”). 
179.  ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., supra note 1, at 4–7. 
180.  Garon, supra note 3.  
181.  NIMIA, supra note 27, at 15.  
182.  Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997). 
183.  Id. at 72–73. 
184.  Id. at 72. 
185.  Id.  
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Without Ringgold’s permission, BET displayed the poster version of the quilt 
as part of the set decoration in several television episodes of a show they 
produced.186 The parties agreed that the total use in “[t]he nine sequences in 
which a portion of the poster is visible range in duration from 1.86 to 4.16 
seconds. The aggregate duration of all nine sequences is 26.75 seconds.”187 The 
court drew a distinction within the concept of de minimis use and explained that 
the parties agreed that the feature time of the poster was 26.75 seconds, but that 
the parties disagreed as to the “observability” of the copyrighted work.188 
The court reasoned that copyrighted material are used in the background to 
increase decorative value but are “filmed at such a distance and so out of focus 
that a typical program viewer would not discern any decorative effect that the 
work of art contributes to the set.”189 In those instances of small or insignificant 
use, use of the copyrighted materials is potentially de minimis and may not 
infringe on a copyright owner’s rights.190 However, the court held that “the 
painting component of the poster is recognizable as a painting, and with 
sufficient observable detail for the ‘average lay observer,’ to discern African–
Americans in Ringgold’s colorful, virtually two-dimensional style.”191 The court 
pointed out the lower court’s misapplication of the four fair use factor 
examination, and held the use was unfair after applying the observability test 




In Sandoval v. New Line Cinema, the court reinforced the use of its 
observability and de minimis analysis in Ringgold.193 Photographer Jorge 
Antonio Sandoval sued film production company, New Line Cinema, after ten of 
his photographs appeared in a film.194 In the scene, ten obscure self-portraits of 
Sandoval appear affixed to a light box.195 The film features photos in eleven 
different shots, none of which appear in focus, for a total of 35.6 seconds.196 
The court stated that “to establish that the infringement of a copyright is de 
minimis, and therefore not actionable, the alleged infringer must demonstrate that 
the copying of the protected material is so trivial ‘as to fall below the quantitative 
threshold of substantial similarity, which is always a required element of 
 
186.  Id.  
187.  Id. at 73. 
188.  Id. at 76.  
189.  Id. at 77.  
190.  Id. at 74–75. 
191.  Id. at 77.  
192.  Id.  
193.  Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998).  
194.  Id. at 216.  
195.  Id.  
196.  Id. 
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actionable copying.’”197 The court noted that it applies this concept on a case-by-
case basis, and that no “bright-line” rules exist related to what is potentially 
“substantially similar.”198 Due to the copyrighted materials’ lack of clearly 
recognizable features, the court reasoned the photographs’ use fell below the 
substantially similar threshold requirement.199 Reasoning that the “average lay 
observer” would have difficulty identifying the photographs as Sandoval’s, the 
court held the use was de minimis.200 
With the complexities of film and the use of clothing to convey particular 
qualities of characters in film, filmmakers and television producers may be liable 
for copyright infringement for using another’s copyrighted textile design in their 
productions without permission if a viewer recognized it.201 Because textile 
designers create their own unique designs affording them copyright protection, 
any reproduced use of their designs in film without permission results in 
copyright infringement unless the use is fair or de minimis.202 
VI. ESTABLISHING A STANDARD 
The Copyright Act protects “…original works of authorship fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression.”203 Additionally, the Copyright Act protects only 
those elements of an expression that are independent and separable from their 
functional or utilitarian features.204 The Copyright Act also prevents any 
unauthorized use of copyrighted items unless that use is determined fair.205 
Courts have had mixed results applying the fair use analysis to copyright 
infringement cases, especially as they relate to materials in film backgrounds.206 
Some courts have even created their own factors to analyze these cases, which 
resulted in uneven application of the fair use defense in copyright infringement 
cases.207 
 
197.  Id. at 217.  
198.  Id. 
199.  Id. at 218.  
200.  Id.  
201.  ACAD. OF MOTION PICTURE ARTS & SCI., supra note 1, at 6; Abelis, supra note 9.  
202.  NIMIA, supra note 27, at 15; Garon, supra note 3. 
203.  17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29). 
204.  Leonard, supra note 97; see also Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002, 
1007 (2017) (developing the current separability standard: “[A] feature incorporated into the design of a useful 
article is eligible for copyright protection only if the feature (1) can be perceived as a two- or three-dimensional 
work of art separate from the useful article and (2) would qualify as a protectable pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural work—either on its own or fixed in some other tangible medium of expression—if it were imagined 
separately from the useful article into which it is incorporated.”).  
205.  See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(3) (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (providing limitations of 
exclusive use of copyrighted materials or works).  
206.  NIMIA, supra note 27, at 15.  
207.  See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995) (using the ordinary 
observer test for analyzing substantial similarity); see also L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 
F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2012) (utilizing the extrinsic and intrinsic tests for determining substantial similarity).  
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In textile design suits, the Second Circuit uses a standard to analyze 
copyright infringement that asks whether the designs are substantially similar.208 
When analyzing the similarities, the court considers “whether ‘an average lay 
observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the 
copyrighted work.’”209 The Ninth Circuit also analyzes textile design copyright 
infringement cases using the substantial similarity standard, but the court 
separates its analysis into an extrinsic and intrinsic test.210 The extrinsic test 
focuses on an “objective comparison” of the designs used, while the intrinsic test 
integrates a more subjective approach to determine whether the designs were 
substantially similar.211 
Regarding background materials in film, courts also use the “substantially 
similar” and “average lay observer” tests to evaluate copyright infringement 
claims.212 However, the Second Circuit court expanded the substantially similar 
analysis by considering whether the copyrighted materials in the background are 
“clearly visible” or identifiable to an ordinary observer.213 The court pointed out 
that the application of their “substantially similar” analysis still requires a case-
by-case determination.214 
To provide better guidance for film production teams for use of textile 
designer’s copyrighted prints in film, Congress should amend the Copyright Act 
to create a fair use factor specifically related to textile designs and film.215 The 
new provision uses Second and Ninth Circuit case law to create an additional 
factor in in the fair use defense for analyzing textile design infringement suits as 
well as the use of background art in film.216 
To reconcile jurisdictional inconsistencies in applying the fair use factor 
analysis to copyright infringement claims, the Copyright Act should be amended 
as follows: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
 
208.  Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002. 
209.  Id.  
210.  L.A. Printex, 676 F.3d at 848. 
211.  Id.  
212.  Ringgold v. Black Ent. Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 1997); Sandoval v. New Line 
Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 1998).   
213.  Id. at 218.  
214.  Id. at 217.  
215.  See supra Part VI.  
216.  See Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd. (Inc.), 71 F.3d 996, 1002–05 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing textile 
design infringement); see also L.A. Printex Industries, Inc. v. Aeropostale, Inc., 676 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 
2012) (discussing textile design infringement); Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 71–72 (discussing fair use analysis in 
background art); Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 217–18 (discussing fair use analysis in background art).  
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole; 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work; and 
(5) as related to the use of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works in 
audiovisual works, the observability and recognition of substantially 
similar use, determined through an objective comparison of each design 
from the viewpoint of an ordinary observer.217 
Two particular states within the Second and Ninth Circuits, California and 
New York, dominate the fashion and film industries.218 Consequently, the Second 
and Ninth Circuits have tailored analyses to address common issues in fashion 
and film within their jurisdictions.219 Whether textile designers retain protection 
over their copyrighted fabric patterns that appear in film, like copyrighted works 
in stock video backgrounds, has “no direct case precedent.”220  
Creating a fair use factor tailored to audiovisual works would avoid the 
confusion of a complex fair use analysis by providing clarity in evaluating the 
use of fabric patterns in film.221 Additionally, reaffirming protections will provide 
certainty in ownership and abilities to pursue legal action for textile designers in 
the event films use their pattern designs without permission.222 
The inclusion of an additional factor does not, however, resolve the 
 
217.  See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107 (West, Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-29) (emphasis added to show 
change made implementing case law analysis from dominating fashion and film industries in the Second and 
Ninth Circuits); Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1002; L.A. Printex, 676 F.3d at 848; Sandoval, 147 F.3d at 217–18.  
218.  Steve Vondran, California Fashion Infringement Lawyer – Copyrighted Prints, Florals, Designs, 
Animal Skins at Issue, VONDRAN LEGAL (Aug. 18, 2017), http://vondranlegal.com/california-fashion-
infringement-lawyer-copyrighted-prints-florals-designs-animal-skins-at-issue (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review); see generally Katie Kilkenny, L.A. Outpacing New York in Film and Digital Media 
Employment, Study Finds, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Sept. 18, 2018, 6:45 AM), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/la-outpacing-new-york-film-digital-media-employment-study-finds-
1143546 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the increase in employment in the 
entertainment industry in California in comparison to New York); Emily Buder, California Ranks 1st for Most 
Film Productions, New York Falls to 6th, NO FILM SCHOOL (June 16, 2016), 
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unreliability of application of the fair use defense.223 The fair use analysis can be 
impractical because of the open-endedness of its fact-based evaluation.224 While 
the application would still require case-by-case analysis, the structure of the 
analysis would focus on observability, thus integrating considerations from 
Second and Ninth Circuit case law to narrow a court’s focus.225 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Textile designers may pursue infringement action when film production 
companies select clothing, made from fabric containing their designs, for use in 
film.226 With the increase of copyright infringement suits by textile designers, the 
need for recognized copyright protection in film is apparent.227 To use, 
reproduce, or recreate fabric patterns in film, filmmakers must obtain permission 
from the owner before using the expression unless the use is “fair.”228 
However, various circuit courts have failed to apply the fair use defense 
uniformly.229 From the current protections, “the only advice an attorney can give 
a client regarding copyrighted work in the background of his video is to either (i) 
get permission and pay licensing fees to the copyright owner, or (ii) avoid using 
the work altogether.”230 Many in the film industry have decided use of 
copyrighted materials without permission is not worth the increased risk of 
litigation given the complexities of applying the de minimis analysis and the 
uneven, individual application of the fair use defense.231 
Though complications regarding the use of copyrighted works in film will 
persist, adding a fifth factor of the fair use defense could resolve inconsistencies 
in the various circuit court’s analysis techniques.232 Creating an additional fair 
use factor inspired by analyses in the dominating film and fashion jurisdictions 
can resolve many misapplication issues by prioritizing the considerations of 
federal courts when analyzing copyright infringement cases.233 
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